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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTES-MOTORCY-
CLISTS' PROTECTIVE HEADGEAR. Appellant was arrested for violation
of a Michigan statute1 requiring all operators and passengers of
motorcycles to wear a crash helmet approved by the department
of state police. Summary judgement was given by the trial court,
from which this appeal was made, requesting a declaration of
rights as to the constitutionality of the amendment. Appellant con-
tended that the amendment violated his constitutional rights as guar-
anteed by the Michigan2 and United States Constitutions.3 The
Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division Two, reversed the trial court
decision, holding the contested amendment to be an improper exer-
cise of the state's police power. They reasoned that while a relation-
ship to the safety and protection of the individual motorcyclist
himself was shown, no sufficient relationship existed between the
amendment and the public health, safety or welfare. American
Motorcycle Assn. v. Davids - Mich.- , 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
The opinion in the instant case turns on the direct question as
to whether or not the statute challenged has a sufficient relationship
to the public health, safety, or welfare. While the Michigan court
concedes that the state does have a substantial interest in highway
safety, they quote from a United States Supreme Court decision
4
that governmental purposes may not be pursued by broadly stifling
fundamental personal liberties. The court here recognizes the prin-
ciple of treating enacted legislation with a presumption of validity,
yet it looks to the purpose of the enactment as intending to protect
the motorcyclist from himself and not to protect the public as it
feels validly exercised police power should. The court looked to the
constitutional protection of being left alone as cited in a recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court,5 and concludes
that only by stretching one's imagination can a relationship be
found between the statute involved and the public health, safety,
morals and welfare.
The power of a state to exercise its police power to provide
1. M icH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.658(d) (1967).
2. MicH. CONST. art 1, § 17 and 23.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. 9 and 14.
4. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
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for the needs of the public is considered an inherent right." A
precise definition of what constitutes the scope of police power
has been virtually impossible because of the rapidly changing social
and economic conditions of this age. However, most attempted defini-
tions have included the element of reasonableness 7 in preserving
the public order, health, safety, and morals." It should be noted
that the scope of the police power of the state cannot be limited
to merely the preservation of the public health, safety and morals,
but includes any valid exercise of the power which promotes these
ends. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the protection
of the health, morals, and lives of citizens is within the legislative
police power, 9 and that the police power of the state embraces
regulations which promote the public convenience or general pros-
perity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health,
safety and morals. The Supreme Court stated that the validity of
the exercise of such power must depend on the circumstances of
each case and the character of the regulations involved, and
whether they are arbitrary or unreasonable, and really designed
to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. 10
While the scope of the police power may be extremely wide,
it must always be subject to certain constitutional limitations" and
cannot indiscriminately interfere with certain constitutionally guar-
anteed rights. The most apparent of these rights are those of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.1 2 While certain exercises of the police power may
infringe on some constitutionally protected rights, they can be
considered valid as long as they bear a real and substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals and welfare and are not un-
reasonable or arbitrary." In the instant case language of a prior
decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is referred to:
Under our Constitution and system of government the object
and aim is to leave the subject entire master of his own
conduct, except in the points wherein the public good re-
quires some direction or restraint.'4
Perhaps the most classic statement regarding the exercise of
6. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1933).
7. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
8. State ex. rel. Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 59 N.W.2d 514, 531, 532, (1953)
Barker v. Palmer, 217 N.C. 619, 8 S.E.2d 610, 613, 614 (1940).
9. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898).
10. C.B. & Q. Railway v. Illinois ex. rel. Comm'rs. 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
11. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co v. State Highway Comm. 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935),
reh. denied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. 14.
13. E.g. Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio 103, 146 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1957), cert. denied,
857 U.S. 904 (1958).
14. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275, 277 (1899).
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the police power is contained in the language of the court in
Lawton v. Steele,15 as affirmed in 1962 in Goldblatt v. Hempstead:
To justify the state in . . . interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear . . . First, that the
interests of the public . . . require such interference; and
second that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
on individuals. 6
From the preceding statements it is apparent that before the
exercise of individual liberties or actions (such as riding a motor-
cycle without a crash helmet) can be prohibited by statute, the
wrong or danger resulting from that act must sufficiently endanger
the public health, safety, morals or welfare so that the infringement
on individual rights and privilege is considered justified.
The current status of the bounds of the police power seems
to be stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical,17 where the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the regulation of the sale of eyeglasses
by other than licensed optometrists and opthamologists. The Court
said that state legislation imposing regulations under the police
power to correct an evil at hand is valid if it might have been
thought by the legislature that the particular measure was a rational
way to correct the evil contended with.:8 It appears as though the
past tests as to the validity of the exercise of police power have
dealt primarily with the regulation and control of industries and
activities which may pose a direct threat to the general public
and their health, safety, or welfare. Typical of such regulations
are those requiring licensing of certain professions, 19 regulation of
highways, prevention of financial hardship and possible reliance
upon welfare agencies of the state,2 0 and requirements for the sup--
port of uninsured motorist funds. 21 It is notable that North Dakota
has required big game hunters to wear red caps while hunting since
1931, 22 a departure from the usual standard in that its protection is
not directed at the pubiic in general. The constitutionality of this
statute has never been tested in the courts, and the statute is still
valid and must be recognized as a type of legislation analagous to
the statute in question in the instant case.
Thus, the conflict between the individual's liberties and public
15. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
16. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra note 7 at 594, 595.
17. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
18. Id. at 488.
19. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
20. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136, 141 (1963).
21. Allied American Mutual Fire In. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md.
607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20-05-05 (1960).
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concern has become the essential issue. This question, because of
the ever changing political, economic and social conditions of the
era, should be decided by the legislature. The United States Supreme
Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, said that "debatable questions
as to reasonableness are not for the courts, but for the legislature"
in determining whether or not the police power is to be reasonably
exercised.2 3
In upholding a Utah statute preventing miners and ore refine-
ment workers from laboring for more than eight hours, the United
States Supreme Court has termed the question as being whether
the legislature had adopted the statute with reasonable discretion,
or whether the action was an excuse for unjust discrimination,
oppression and spoilation of a particular class. 24 In that decision,
while discussing the state's power to protect individuals against
themselves, the court said:
The state still retains an interest in his welfare, however
reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum
of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and
welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.2 5
In holding the statute in the instant case to be unconstitutional,
the Michigan court finds support from three decisions 26 of other
courts regarding similar statutes.2 7 In People v. Smallwood, 28 the
Irondequoit, New York, Court of Special Sessions held that while
the state did have the right to require all vehicle operators and
highway users to waive certain rights and privileges for the protec-
tion of other motorists or vehicles, the right to wear certain clothing
is not a privilege that can be waived, provided that the clothing is
not indecent. The statute was again held unconstitutional by the
Oakfield New York Court of Special Sessions two months later in
People v. Carmichae,29 finding the legislation intended to require
a citizen to protect his own well being rather than to make the high-
ways safer and more useful to the general public. The Smallwood
court seemed to foresee some unfavorable consequences of upholding
such legislation, stating that if protective headgear could be required
of motorcyclists, the legislature could require protective shin guards,
knee and elbow pads for motorcyclists, as well as requiring auto-
23. Supra note 7 at 595.
24. Holden v. Hardy, supra note 9 at 398.
25. Id. at 397.
26. Everhardt v. New Orleans,-La.-, 208 So.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1968) People v.
Carmichael, 53 Mlsc.2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Oakfield CL Sp. Sess. 1967) People v.
Smallwood, 52 Misc.2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Irondequolt CL Sp. Sess. 1967).
27. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 90 § 7 (1968); N.Y. STAT. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW,
§ 381 Subdiv. 6 (McKinney 1966) R. LI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-10.1-4 (1956); CiTY OP
NEW ORLEANS PENAL ORDINANCE 3536 M.C.S., § 38-228.1 (c).
28. People v. Smallwood, aupra note 26.
29. People v. Carmichael, supra note 26.
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mobile drivers to wear protective headgear. Their opinion was that
the statute merely prevented the individual from exercising his
judgment or preference as to personal adornment. Eleven months
after Carmichael in Everhardt v. New Orleans,8° a New Orleans
city ordinance3" was held unconstitutional by the Louisiana Court
of Appeals in that it was violative of Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections and placed undue restrictions on one class of the motoring
public without a salutory effect on the public at large. The reason-
ing was that while regulations for the public safety may affect
one group more than others and still remain in the constitutional
pale, such regulations must promote the public good. The decision
in Everhardt was further supported by the idea that an individual
cannot be constitutionally required to protect his well being so long
as his conduct affects only himself.
Contrary to the aforementioned cases, six later decisions have
upheld the challenged legislation 2 and found not unreasonable
imposition on the individual. In People v. Bielmeyer," the Buffalo,
New York, City Court looked to the danger of a motorcyclist being
struck by a flying object propelled by another vehicle causing dis-
traction in the operation of the motorcycle, which would result
in subsequent loss of control of the vehicle. The Bielmeyer court
feared that a motorcycle out of control could cause the motorcyclist
and his machine to be propelled off the road or into the opposite
lane, causing damages and injuries to other motorists, passengers
or pedestrians.
The Erie County, New York, Court in People v. Schmidt 4
expressed the same danger, referring to the delicate balance re-
quired of a motorcyclist and his machine, the slight distraction
needed to upset the necessary balance, causing chaos for operators,
riders, and anyone in their path. In the instant case, the Michigan
court attempted to distinguish Schmidt by stating that a windshield
requirement would accomplish the same objectives. This writer
agrees that a windshield or face protective device would be more
effective to protect against distraction from flying objects. How-
ever, it does not seem certain that anything short of complete pro-
tection from exposure would bring the desired result, as speculated
by the Smallwood"5 decision. In sustaining the legislation in Schmidt,
30. Everhardt v. New Orleans, supra note 26.
31. NEW ORLEANS CITY PENAL ORDINANCE, 3536 M.C.S. § 38-228.1(c).
32. Commonwealth v. Howie, -Mass.-, 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968); State v. Lombardi,
-R.I.-, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); People v. Carmichael, 56 Mlsc.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d
931 (Genessee County Ct. 1968) ; People v. Newhouse, 55 Mlsc.2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713
(Ithaca City Ct. 1968) ; People v. Schmidt, 54 Mlisc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Erie County
Ct. 1967) ; People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
33. People v. Blelmeyer, &upra note 32.
34. People v. Schmidt, supra note 32.
35. People v. Smallwood, supra note 26.
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the court favored expansion of the scope of police power when
related to public safety, contending that in such areas the legis-
lature should have more than normal latitude in regulating pubiic
conduct.36
A further justification of legislation requiring motorcyclists to
wear helmets, even though their primary purpose may be for
the protection of the individual motorcyclist or passenger, has been
enunciated in a later New York County Court 7 and Rhode Island
Supreme Court38 decisions upholding the challenged statutes. These
courts have reasoned that it is a state's responsibility to prevent
individuals from becoming public charges and burdens to the state
through state welfare or institutional care. They indicate that
those failing to wear protective headgear are highly susceptible
to injuries which if not fatal, will more than likely incapacitate
the victim, rendering him a person for which the state welfare pro-
grams would be responsible.
In reversing the earlier Carmichael decision 9 the Genessee
County, New York, Court held that the infringement of individual
constitutional rights is incidental to the exercise of the police power
and not unreasonable when used to promote the public welfare.
The most recent decision is that of Commonwealth v. Howie,4 0
where the Massachusetts Supreme Court found the state statute4 1
to be within the power of the legislature to pass reasonable measures
for the promotion of safety upon public ways. The Massachusetts
court looked to the interests of motorcyclists and others who may
use the public highways, and that the act bore the necessary relation
to public health and general welfare to be a valid exercise of the
police power. In this decision the instant case was dismissed as
being not controlling.
We thus see two sides of the conflict between individual liberties
and the interests of the public. It appears that those decisions
condemning motorcycle helmet legislation desire to place a strict
limitation on legislative interference with personal liberties, honor-
ing the individual's desire to disregard his health and safety by
permitting harm to himself without concern by the government.
The cases supporting the legislation, which at this time are in the
majority, seem to recognize the moral aspects of the legislative
intent to protect the individual from injuries which he doesn't
seem to care about, either because of his lack of judgment or
lack of concern about the future. The primary basis for upholding the
36. People v. Schmidt, supra note 32.
37. People v. Newhouse, supra note 32.
38. State v. Lombardi, supra note 32.
39. People v. Carmichael, supra note 32.
40. Commonwealth v. Howie, supra note 32.
41. MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 7 (1958).
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legislation in these cases appears to be the minimization of public
welfare cases.
It is apparent that the desire of legislators in enacting such
statutes was basically to protect those immature and careless young-
sters and adults who would injure themselves because of their vain
desire to disregard safety for the sake of personal appearance. It
is doubtful that those challenging the statutes desire to foresee the
tragic consequences, and irrevocable nature of injuries common to
victims of motorcycle accidents.
If, contrary to the majority of decisions rendered at this
time, the eventual majority will be to strike down such legislation
it is the opinion of this writer that some other means may be
found to enforce the legislative intent. To carry out the desired
results we may refer to tort law concepts to find a possible means
of support for the desired protection. It is suggested that failure
to use protective headgear may be a form of contributory negli-
gence, thus denying the nonuser of any recovery for injuries sus-
tained as a result of such nonuse in a contributory negligence juris-
diction. This approach has been recited in a Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision 42 regarding failure to use seat belts and strongly
advocated for future use.4 3 Even in a comparative negligence juris-
diction such failure would tend to reduce the amount of damages.
It would appear that the comparative negligence theory would work
the most equitable results in cases where failure to wear the pro-
tective headgear has been a contributing factor to the injury, and
not the cause of the accident. This latter theory would still impose
the burden upon the wrongdoer, but the amount of damages would
be reduced by the failure to wear the headgear. This defense
to recovery would, however, require proof that the injuries were
caused by the failure to have the helmet on, creating problems
in each individual case. 4 4 Another indirect consideration for en-
forcement of the policy requiring or urging the use of protective
headgear would be the inclusion by insurance companies of a clause
requiring any protected individual under an insurance policy to
wear the headgear to obtain coverage.
It is apparent that most courts are going to be willing to use
the theory of preventing welfare burdens to sustain protective head-
gear legislation, and it appears that the instant case, while well
reasoned, will become the minority. No argument can be made
against the moral purpose of the legislation discussed, even though
in clear terms the acts do somewhat infringe on the personal be-
42. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
43. Marks, Contributory Negligence for Failure to Wear Seat Belts, 1968 INs. L.J. 5.
44. Note, Federal Legislation: The National Traffic and Motor Veaicle Safety Act:
Mvist the Reasonable Man be Concerned? 19 FLA. L. Rxv. 635, 651, 652 (1967).
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havior and actions of those affected, and do not meet complete
compliance with the standards established for an exercise of the
police power.
JOHN C. LERVICK
